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Actors in Private Food Governance: The Legitimacy of Retail Standards 
and Multistakeholder Initiatives with Civil Society Participation. 
 
Doris Fuchs, Agni Kalfagianni and Tetty Havinga 
 
 
Democratic legitimacy is rarely associated with private governance. After all, private actors 
are not legitimized through elections by a demos. Instead of abandoning democratic principles 
when entering the private sphere of governance, however, this article argues in favour of 
employing alternative criteria of democracy in assessments. Specifically, this article uses the 
criteria of participation, transparency and accountability to evaluate the democratic legitimacy 
of private food retail governance institutions. It pursues this evaluation of the democratic 
legitimacy of these institutions against the background of their ambivalent impact on the 
sustainability of the global agrifood system. The paper refers to a range of cases of private 
retail standards with different governance structures and substantial foci to illustrate its 
argument.  
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I. Introduction 
 
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the democratic legitimacy of private food 
governance institutions in the retail sector. We concentrate on private retail standards because 
this is a form of private food governance that has expanded dramatically over the last couple 
of decades. Moreover, previous studies have found that private retail governance is associated 
with highly ambivalent implications for the sustainability of the global agrifood system 
(Fuchs, Kalfagianni, and Arentsen 2009). Accordingly, this form of governance urgently 
needs to be evaluated regarding its democratic justifiability.   
 
The paper starts from the recognition that global food and agricultural governance is 
increasingly being created not only by (inter)governmental actors but also by private actors. 
In the food sector, as elsewhere, next to traditional command-and-control, alternative forms of 
regulation are being explored, such as self-regulation, co-regulation, management-based 
regulation and other private systems of governance (Aalders and Wilthagen 1997; Braithwaite 
1982; Coglianese and Lazer 2003; Furger 1997; Gunningham and Sinclair 1999; Hutter 
2001:9-10). In these new forms of regulation, private actors are assuming pivotal roles in 
terms of rule-making, monitoring compliance, and enforcement. Food industry and retail 
corporations, in particular, have become key players in the governance of the global food 
system through the creation of governance institutions such as private standards, corporate 
social responsibility initiatives (CSR) and public-private or private-private partnerships 
(PPPs).  
 
This transition from public to private regulation gives rise to important new theoretical and 
political concerns of legitimacy (Newman 2001; Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden 2001) 
and challenges existing conceptualisations of regulation (Black 2002; Sinclair 1997). Public 
regulation is considered legitimate because of democratic decision-making procedures on 
rules, implementation, monitoring and enforcement that are meant to safeguard the 
proportionality of rules and measures, inclusion of all relevant interests and redress 
procedures for victims. Most importantly, however, public regulation is legitimised through 
its roots in decisions taken (through representatives) by the general public.  
 
This positive evaluation of the legitimacy of public governance has to be taken with a grain of 
salt, though. Legitimacy chains become longer and are more loosely defined if (elected) 
governments nominate bureaucrats to represent them in international negotiations and 
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organizations. Even more importantly, public regulation in the international realm frequently 
takes on the character of a pursuit of “private” interests with governments trying to advance 
the interests of their country (or segments of its population or economic actors) rather than 
that of the global population, as Conzelmann and Wolf (2008) have convincingly argued. In 
consequence, when assessing the democratic legitimacy of private governance in this paper, 
we are not meaning to imply that public governance is definitely unassailable from this 
perspective and not worthy of inquiry. In this paper, however, we explicitly focus on the 
democratic legitimacy of private governance because we consider it a highly relevant 
phenomenon in today‟s global food governance which is likely to cause substantial social 
transformations and a redistribution of income and wealth.  
 
Private rules in the form of standards have far reaching consequences affecting a wide range 
of actors, such as consumers and suppliers across the globe. As shown by a growing number 
of studies, the implications of private food governance institutions on the sustainability of the 
global food system are ambivalent, if we define sustainability as including the dimensions of 
food safety, environmental well-being, and farmers‟ incomes. These implications may tend to 
be positive in some aspects such as the food safety in developed countries but extremely 
negative in others (Barrientos et al. 2001; Fuchs et al. 2009; Van der Grijp et al. 2005). 
Especially in developing countries, a trend toward the marginalisation of small farmers and 
retailers and subsequently an increase in economic inequality due to the expansion in private 
retail standards can be observed. The latter aspect derives from the situation that these private 
food standards constrain market access (Busch 2000). The purchasing power of private food 
actors, in particular today‟s supermarket chains, makes private standards obligatory for any 
actor who wants to participate in the (global) market (Fuchs et al. 2009; Havinga 2006).  
 
Our objective in this article, therefore, is to inquire into the democratic legitimacy of private 
retail food governance. In pursuit of this objective, we apply the criteria of participation, 
transparency and accountability proposed by Porter and Ronit (forthcoming) in an evaluation 
of a range of institutions of private retail food governance playing a prominent role in the 
global agrifood system today. The article proceeds as follows. The next section provides the 
empirical background to our analysis. It delineates the rise in private retail food governance, 
presents prominent examples of relevant standards and initiatives, and sketches the 
ambivalent implications of private retail food governance for the sustainability of the global 
agrifood system. Then, section three turns to the question of democratic legitimacy and 
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introduces the concepts of participation, transparency and accountability as criteria for 
assessing the democratic legitimacy of private (retail food) governance. The section also 
scrutinizes and dismisses alternative criteria, in particular output legitimacy. Section four 
pursues the empirical analysis of the democratic legitimacy of private retail food governance 
on the basis of the criteria developed in section three. Finally, section five concludes our 
article by summarizing our findings and delineating their implications for research and policy.  
 
 
II. Background: The Rise of Private Retail Food Governance and the 
Sustainability of the Global Agrifood System 
 
In today‟s global food governance, private actors, in particular corporations, play a larger role 
than ever before (Clapp and Fuchs 2009). In particular, they have become rule-setters rather 
than rule-takers and are deciding, implementing, monitoring and enforcing rules and 
regulations to an increasing extent. Such “private governance” can take a variety of forms 
ranging from Corporate Social Responsibility initiatives to self-regulation to co-regulation 
(e.g. Public-Private Partnerships) and may encompass a wide variety of instruments such as 
voluntary and cooperative agreements, codes of conduct, corporate reporting, as well as 
accounting and self-auditing. As one of the key developments in recent years, big 
supermarket chains have developed initiatives to ensure a certain quality of retail food 
products by committing suppliers to a specified set of standards. Importantly, private 
governance institutions, in general, and private retail food governance institutions, in 
particular, frequently tend to acquire a de facto compulsory role despite their de jure 
voluntary nature (Blowfield 2005). By adopting such standards, private food companies and 
especially retail corporations can constrain market access and thereby basically force 
suppliers to accept them (Busch 2000; Fulponi 2006; Havinga 2006).
1
 Table 1 provides a 
brief summary of some prominent institutions of private retail food governance today.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 In consequence, the term “self-regulation” under which these standards are being discussed in the literature is 
highly misleading. The standards tend to have significant implications for a large group of stakeholders and 
impose costs on suppliers, in particular. 
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Table 1: Prominent Private Retail Food Standards and Initiatives 
The British Retail Consortium Global Standard for Food Safety (BRC) was created in 1998 in 
order to evaluate the manufacturing of retailers‟ own brand products. It delineates more than 250 
requirements including comprehensive norms for food safety and quality schemes, products and 
process management as well as personal hygiene of personnel. In 2002, a Packaging Standard was 
published, followed by a Consumer Products standard in 2003 and finally the BRC Standard for 
Storage and Distribution in 2006. The last standard addresses companies‟ storage and/or distribution 
of food, consumer goods and packaging materials. Each of these standards is revised and updated at 
least every three years. For most UK and Scandinavian retailers, BRC certification is required in 
order to consider business with suppliers (http://www.ceres-cert.com/en_brc.html, 24-11-2008).  
The International Food Standard (IFS) is a standard developed by retailers and wholesalers to 
ensure the safety of own-brand products. It covers common internationally accepted audit standards 
with the aim to improve safety for the consumers. IFS was initiated in 2002 by German food retailers 
from the primary association of retailers HDE (Hauptverband des Deutschen Einzelhandels). In 2003, 
French food retailers (and wholesalers) from the FCD (Fèderation des entreprises du Commerce et de 
la Distribution) joined the IFS Working Group. The development of the current version of IFS Food, 
(version 5) is a collaboration of three retail federations from Germany, France and Italy. Retailers 
from Austria, Poland, Spain and Switzerland also support IFS as their food safety standard. The IFS 
Food standard deals with processing of food and contains 250 requirements divided over 5 chapters. 
Next to production process (product specifications, pest control, traceability), management 
responsibility (e.g. corporate policy), quality management system (HACCP, recordkeeping), resource 
management (personnel hygiene) and measurements and improvements (internal audit, product 
recall). The standard also contains an audit protocol.   
Safe Quality Food (SQF) is a food safety and quality certification program for primary production 
(SQF 1000) and for food manufacturing and distribution (SQF 2000) owned by the Food Marketing 
Institute (FMI). The FMI membership represents three-quarters of all retail food stores in the U.S. and 
200 companies from over 50 countries. The SQF program was developed in 1994 by the West-
Australian Department of Agriculture and sold to American FMI in 2003. SQF is designed as a food 
safety program and incorporates product quality. Certification is annual at three levels: food safety 
fundamentals (only for low risk products), certified HACCP food safety plans and comprehensive 
quality management systems development. After achieving level 3 a certified supplier is authorized to 
use the SQF certification trademark. „Responsible environmental practice‟ and „responsible social 
practice‟ are optional modules for suppliers „whose markets require additional assurances of 
responsible environmental and social practice‟. 
The Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) was initiated in 2000 by a group of international retailers 
in order to agree on globally accepted food safety standards. The initiative sets baseline requirements 
for food safety standards and intends to improve efficiency costs throughout the food chain. Its 
central aim is to strengthen consumer confidence in food bought in retail outlets. By now, four food 
safety standards have been benchmarked to be in compliance with the GFSI Guidance Document: 
BRC, Dutch HACCP, IFS, and SQF. GFSI‟s aim is to have all products sold meet this standard. In 
2006, a survey of the world‟s leading supermarkets found that 75-99% of food supplies sold by them 
are certified against a GFSI benchmarked standard (Fulponi 2006). 
The Global Partnership for Good Agricultural Practice (GlobalGap) (known as EurepGap until 
2007) was developed in 1997 by a group of European retailers. While initially only applying to fruits 
and vegetables, it now covers meat products and fish from aquaculture as well. Completion and 
verification of a checklist consisting of 254 questions is required in order to acquire Global-Gap 
certification. This checklist is divided into 41 “major musts”, 122 “minor musts” as well as 91 
recommendations (“shoulds”). Traceability and food safety are covered by major must practices 
while minor musts cover animal welfare issues and environmental concerns in the context of human 
health, e.g. release of toxins. Environmental conservation practices fall in the category of 
recommendations. 
The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) is a label for sustainable fishery, created in 1997 as a 
result of an agreement between Unilever and the WWF. The idea behind MSC is to address world-
wide decline in fish stocks by awarding sustainably managed fisheries with a certification and a label 
that could be affixed to retail products (Ponte 2007:161). The standard is based on 3 principles 
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(maintenance of the target fish stock, minimal environmental impact and effective management) and 
31 performance indicators. It can be applied to a wide range of fisheries found across the world 
coasts, oceans and freshwater bodies (Leadbitter et al. 2006). At the moment, MSC aims at specific 
fisheries rather than species that could come from multiple fisheries and does not cover aquaculture 
(Iles 2007). Moreover, it is currently quite small in its fishery coverage and is mostly active in Europe 
but its endorsement by major retailers is expected to change this situation in the future (Iles 2007).  
The Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) was formed in 1998 by UK trade union representatives of the 
Trade Union Congress (TUC), the International Textile Garment and Leather Workers‟ Federation 
(ITGLWF), the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), and of NGOs, such as 
Oxfam and CAFOD (Hughes 2001: 422). UK supermarkets participated in the initiative since its 
inception (Smith and Barrientos 2005) and currently all but one of the major British supermarkets are 
part of the initiative (http://www.ethicaltrade.org/Z/abteti/who/memb/list.shtml#co). ETI aims to 
develop an agreed baseline code of conduct covering employment conditions among companies, 
unions and NGOs, and examining how systems of monitoring and verification can be established on 
the basis of ILO core conventions and UN human rights‟ standards. As a UK initiative, its ultimate 
goal is to ensure that the working conditions of workers producing for the UK market at least meet 
international labour standards. ETI is a code of conduct applying to food products as well as to other 
products such as clothing. Scholars note that the ETI should be distinguished from fair trade or 
alternative trade in that it does not only cover small producers and it does not carry a specific seal of 
approval, although companies can advertise it if they want to (Smith and Barrientos 2005). Rather, it 
is based on a company applying a code to its suppliers in the same way as it applies other conditions 
of supply covering production and product specification (ibid.).  
 
  
Given the proliferation of private governance institutions in the area of agriculture and food, 
their implications for the sustainability of the global agrifood system become crucial. As 
previous research has found, however, these impacts differ in terms of the dimensions of 
sustainability considered, i.e. food safety, environmental sustainability, social sustainability, 
and in terms of the distribution of target group considered, i.e. consumers in developed or 
developing countries (Barrientos et al. 2001, Fuchs et al. 2009, Van der Grijp et al. 2005).
2
 
 
Most private retail food standards address issues of food safety, which accordingly has 
improved in the food chain.
3
 These positive effects exist mainly for consumers in the 
industrialized countries and perhaps wealthy consumers in developing countries, however. 
While optimistic observers note that higher standards for export markets can lead to spillover 
effects for domestic food safety in developing countries (Jaffee and Henson 2004), critical 
scholars report that the new retail standards lead to an increasing gap in quality between 
export and domestic food products (Van der Grijp et al. 2005). 
                                                 
2
 One can also differentiate sustainability implications for wealthy and poor consumers in developed and 
especially developing countries. 
3
 Quality has not necessarily improved in parallel, however, as the schemes do not address questions of distance 
travelled and its implications, for instance. Due to these distances, fruits and vegetables are picked early from the 
field and need to be artificially gassed to ripe, for example. Moreover, the need to have strong varieties which 
will survive the early harvest and transport and have a long shelf-life frequently creates products end up 
“relatively tasteless, nutritionally weak” (Robison 1984: 289). At the same time, quality standards assure that at 
least some level of quality is maintained, however. 
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Environmental dimensions of sustainability tend to play a much less prominent role. Retailers 
are increasingly under pressure to improve at least their environmental performance, of 
course. Yet, many private standards evaluating retail environmental performance cover only 
particular goods or companies and do not apply to the sector as a whole (Lang and Barling 
2007). Moreover, food retail standards - to the extent that they cover environmental issues at 
all - address selected elements of environmental protection only, often determined by 
visibility and marketing qualities for consumers in the North. Of the initiatives presented 
above only the MSC awards environment a truly prominent role. For other initiatives claiming 
to pay significant attention to environmental issues as well, such as the GlobalGap, most 
specifications for environmental conservation are recommendations (see GlobalGap 2008) 
and non-compliance does not always prevent certification.
4
 More importantly, the emphasis 
on various sustainability issues within the GlobalGap initiative has gradually decreased from 
its launch until today (Van der Grijp et al. 2005).
5
  
 
The social dimension of sustainability, even if formally included in mainstream retail 
standards, receives the least attention (e.g. GlobalGap). While some standards address issues 
of worker welfare, other social implications, in particular the income and well-being of 
farmers in developing countries, are left out.
6
 This is particular noteworthy, as these 
implications are significant indeed. Critical observers associate the proliferation of private 
retail standards with dramatic income losses and restrictions in market access for small 
farmers and enterprises, who cannot afford the high implementation costs (Brown and Sander 
2007; Ponte 2007).
7
 Even significant efforts such as the ETI fail to recognize crucial societal 
issues, such as the different priorities for female workers and farmers stemming from the 
gendered nature of women‟s obligations to meet domestic and household commitments as 
                                                 
4
 In GlobalGap, for major norms 100% compliance is compulsory, whereas for minor norms this is 95%. 
Recommendations are inspected but are not a prerequisite for the granting of a GlobalGAP certificate (Van der 
Grijp 2008, p. 122). 
5
 There are other examples with more ambitious goals, such as Farm Biodiversity Action Plans (Sainsboury‟s for 
premium fresh produce suppliers), conservation plans linked to FWAG (Tesco‟s Natures Choice), and the 
development of additional audit requirements for the Assured Produce Scheme linked to the LEAF audit 
(Waitrose‟s LEAF Marque Brand) on the environmental side (Baines 2005). Yet, these standards have an 
extremely small market share. 
6
 Similarly, capital concentration in the retail sector and the global expansion of the operations of the large retail 
chains are threatening the livelihoods of smaller local retailers as well. This trend is particularly recognizable in 
regions currently targeted by expansion strategies of retail corporations such as Eastern Europe and Asia. 
7
 Reardon et al. (2001) report, for instance, that thousands of small dairy operations have gone out of business in 
the past five years in the extended Mercosur area, because the new quality and safety standards for milk and milk 
products implied large investments in equipment and buildings and coordination and management. Likewise, 
NGOs have pointed out that hundreds of thousands of small farmers in Africa are losing or will lose their living 
in the wake of the implementation of the GlobalGap standards (ActionAid 2005).   
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well as their employment related responsibilities (Pearson 2007). In sum, private retail food 
standards are creating trends in employment and income that result in highly uneven and 
unequal development in the producing countries and regions and imply the degradation of 
social well-being for a substantial share of the population there (Van der Grijp et al. 2005).  
 
To summarise, private retail food governance tends to have positive effects on food safety and 
some quality. With regard to developing countries, however, this is limited to food products 
for export markets. Likewise, private food governance can foster some environmental 
improvements, although not as systematically and comprehensively as one would desire. 
What private food governance does not foster and in fact tends to worsen, however, is the 
aspect of the social sustainability of the global agrifood system. It is due to these costs, which 
private retail food governance imposes on the sustainability of the global agrifood system, in 
particular, that its democratic legitimacy needs to be assessed.   
 
III. The Democratic Legitimacy of Private Food Retail Governance 
Any attempt to offer a democratic assessment of private governance with traditional notions 
of democracy will fail as fundamental democracy requirements are violated. Retailers, as any 
other private actor, are not democratically elected and cannot not be held responsible by a 
relatively homogenous demos, since such a public rarely exists at the global level (Brühl 
2002). Instead of abandoning democratic principles when entering the global private sphere, 
however, we argue in favour of moving away from the domestic analogy and adopting 
alternative criteria for democratic checks and balances (see also Keohane 2006).  
 
Different interpretations of democracy beyond the state can be identified in the literature.  The 
concepts of “cosmopolitan democracy” (Held 1995) or “discursive democracy” (Dryzek 
1990), for instance, offer useful insights for democratic forms of global governance based on 
notions of global citizenship and discursive practices. Yet these approaches also suffer from a 
number of shortcomings that make their applicability in the cases examined here problematic. 
More specifically, the emphasis on private actors, especially business, is often lacking and 
they tend to be too philosophical to allow for the identification of concrete democratic 
challenges (Porter and Ronit forthcoming). 
 
We evaluate the democratic legitimacy of private food retail governance institutions using the 
criteria of participation, transparency and accountability (Schaller 2007). These three 
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dimensions are widely recognised values and offer strong analytical advantages in the study 
of private institutions from a democratic perspective (Porter and Ronit forthcoming). 
Moreover, they are well suited to study highly complex environments that are associated with 
transnational corporate activities, and new modes of democratic policy-making evolving 
alongside traditional institutions (ibid.).  
 
Participation should include all the actors who are potentially affected by the decisions to 
ensure their autonomy under law, according to procedural arguments. At the most 
fundamental level, participation requires access to information and decision-making. Three 
broad categories of actors can be involved in private retail food governance: state actors, 
business actors and civil society organisations. These represent the actors directly or 
indirectly affected by the relevant regulations and standards. Private food governance 
institutions affect a wide variety of stakeholders ranging from the farmer to the consumer. 
Business and the general public, or civil society organizations as the representatives of the 
latter, are those actors directly affected by private food governance. State actors are indirectly 
affected (except for the case of co-regulation in the form of public-private partnerships) as 
private regulation always interacts and sometimes interferes with public regulation and in so 
far as the private regulation has consequences for the need of state intervention.
8
 With respect 
to business actors, one needs to differentiate between retailers and food producers and 
processors in this respect, as well as consider those business actors providing services to the 
industry such as certification and auditing companies. With regards to civil society, 
environmental and development NGOs as well as labour organisations are typical 
representatives. Next to the type of actors involved, attention needs to be paid with respect to 
their region of origin, when assessing the democratic legitimacy of private retail food 
governance institutions. Specifically, one needs to consider the distribution in decision 
making power between representatives of the South and those of the North.
9
  
 
We evaluate participation as a criterion for the legitimacy of private retail food governance in 
terms of the participatory roles awarded to the different groups by a given governance 
institution. In our evaluation, we concentrate on the actors directly affected by the institutions, 
                                                 
8
 The private regulation may increase/decrease wealth in certain sectors of society, for instance, leading for more 
or less need for welfare provisioning by the state. 
9
 This aspect becomes somewhat difficult, when talking about developmental NGOs, of course. Frequently, their 
stated objective is the representation of the interests of the population or specific segments of the population in 
developing countries, while their decision-making organs are dominated by individuals from developed 
countries. This difficulty should not lead to a neglect of the question of the distribution in decision making 
power between North and South in a private food governance institution, in general. 
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i.e. the different types of business actors as well as civil society representatives and their 
region of origin. These actors may be given decision-making power in the central governing 
organ of the private governance institution. They may be provided with access to meetings of 
this organ, but have only a consulting status. Finally, they may be excluded from the meetings 
altogether. Participation as a criterion for the democratic legitimacy of a private food 
governance institution would require that all of the groups affected by that institutions need to 
receive decision-making power in the central governing organ of the institution.  
 
Transparency refers to the provision of timely, reliable and comprehensible information on 
the governance and performance characteristics of the standards. It is an important dimension 
of legitimacy because it enhances public scrutiny and visibility in complex environments, 
thereby also strengthening meaningful participation and ensuring accountability. 
Transparency can be internal and external, i.e. information available only to members and 
information available to the general public. We are specifically interested in the external 
aspect of transparency examining access to information by stakeholders not participating in 
the ownership of the standards but directly or indirectly affected by them. Such stakeholders 
include, for instance, the “governed”, i.e. farmers and farmer workers, as well as civil society 
organisations and the general public.  
 
We evaluate transparency on the basis of information provided on the standards‟ websites, as 
well as access to conferences and other meetings organised by the standard owners (see also 
Schaller 2007). Governance related transparency means access to information on decision-
making structures and processes. Performance related transparency means access to 
information on the associated (public) benefits gained by the implementation of the standard, 
for instance, in the context of food safety and/or environmental sustainability. We also reflect 
on the standards‟ issue coverage as selective transparency can obscure the visibility of the 
standards‟ full range of impacts, thus fostering a partial appraisal of the standards‟ role in the 
agri-food system. The focus on food safety, for instance, can shift interest away from 
sustainability “externalities” along the supply chain.  
 
We consider transparency timely when there is reference to recent events, projects etc. as well 
as when critical information is available before important decisions have been made. 
Reliability of information depends on the existence of external mechanisms of information 
control instead of simply self-reporting activities on a voluntary basis. Regarding 
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comprehensibility, given the global coverage of standards and the diverse audiences affected 
by them, we consider the language of communication of information and the level of 
technical detail and discourse important parameters. We expect differences in the visibility of 
standards between Northern and Southern publics, however, as transparency is also subject to 
technological and financial constraints.  
 
Finally, accountability is a fundamental prerequisite for the exercise of democratic control 
over governance institutions. Accountability is needed in terms of the internal and external 
auditing of regulations and standards, and more crucially, in terms of the relationship between 
the governance institution and the affected stakeholders or general public. It is the 
fundamental idea of democratic governance that the affected public should be able to hold 
decision-makers accountable and “vote” them out of office if a given governance institution 
performs badly.  
In liberal democracies, accountability is ensured through mechanisms of representation, rights 
of legislators to scrutinise and hold public servants accountable, and public answerability of 
governmental agencies and officials (Gulbrandsen 2008). Public law, however, is not the only 
source of accountability. In private governance arrangements, internal accountability is 
ensured through delegations, e.g. corporate CEOs are responsible to their board of directors 
who are responsible to stockholders (Keohane 2006).  More difficult, though not impossible, 
is to achieve external accountability, where organizations are held accountable not to those 
who delegated power to them but to those affected by their decisions. In that context, Furger 
(1997) underlines the “role of intermediary organisations as institutions that are particularly 
suited to develop and maintain standards of accountability” (p.449). In other words, actors, 
whom those governed by an institution trust in terms of the neutrality of perspective and 
expertise, can be awarded the role of operating the instruments in place to hold the 
“governors” accountable. In relation to the discussed examples of private governance, 
intermediary organisations who could potentially play such a role are auditing organisations 
and certification bodies, for example.   
Auditing or third party certification mechanisms provide checks and balances regarding the 
standards‟ violation codes but they do not necessarily extend this accountability to farmers 
and farm workers (see also Schaller 2007). Moreover, these mechanisms do not cover the 
public affected by the externalities of the standards, for instance, in their environmental and 
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particularly social dimensions. In consequence, additional mechanisms of intervention that 
can strengthen the external accountability of the standards are required. 
Accordingly, we evaluate internal accountability in terms of existence of responsibility 
mechanisms from board members to their constituencies and civil society representatives to 
their organisations. We evaluate external accountability in terms of the presence of an 
independent and trusted actor, who is awarded the authority and instruments to regularly 
conduct checks of the performance of the given private retail food governance institution. 
Moreover, we define the ability of the affected public or its representatives to intervene and 
adjust the governance institution as a prerequisite for accountability.  
Having defined participation, transparency, and accountability, in this manner, we are setting 
high benchmarks for our evaluation of the democratic legitimacy of private retail food 
governance, of course. One can easily point out that public international governance 
frequently does not completely fulfill these requirements either. Again, our aim in this 
analysis is not to paint a black and white picture of private versus public food governance. 
Rather, we consider private food governance to be such an important phenomenon that we 
want to explore its democratic legitimacy in its own right. Specifically, we want to identify 
areas in which private retail food governance performs well from the perspective of 
democratic legitimacy and areas in which notable problems exist. Moreover, we want to 
compare this situation against different types of private retail food governance institutions. 
Only on the basis of such insights can one then discuss ways to improve the democratic 
legitimacy of private food governance. 
 
Why Not Output Legitimacy? 
Before we proceed with the analysis, a note has to be made regarding alternative concepts of 
evaluating the democratic legitimacy of private governance. Some scholars have suggested 
the concepts of input, output and throughput legitimacy here (Erman and Uhlin forthcoming, 
Scharpf 1998). Input legitimacy refers to the criterion of participation, while throughput 
legitimacy tends to be interpreted as combining aspects of transparency, responsiveness, and 
fairness of the procedures of a governance institution. Thus, the concept of input legitimacy is 
covered by our criteria as well. The problem with the concept of throughput legitimacy is the 
combination of the aspects of transparency and responsiveness (or in our terms 
accountability), as well as of positive and normative criteria, which inhibit its systematic 
empirical application. The major problem, however, exists with respect to the concept of 
 12 
output legitimacy, especially as it frequently is used as a justification for the democratic 
legitimacy of private governance, but applied in very sweeping and superficial terms. This 
handling of the concept and its empirical application serves to hide its fundamental problems. 
Yet, these problems exist and need to be named. 
 
The concept of output legitimacy refers to the notion that legitimacy can arise from the ability 
to provide results rather than from the existence of participatory norms and procedures or the 
presence of checks and balances (Scharpf 1998). Put differently, the “effectiveness” of a 
governance institution functions as a source of legitimacy, here. To the extent, then, that 
private governance is as or more effective than public governance, it could be considered as 
having output legitimacy.  
 
It is extremely difficult if not impossible to assess the effectiveness of a private governance 
institution, however. Assessing effectiveness requires the definition of objectives, against 
which the performance of the governance institution can be evaluated. Yet, different 
stakeholders will tend to define different objectives, or even similar objectives differently. As 
we argue below, different actors in the food chain tend to define very different sustainability 
criteria, for instance. In other words, the objectives of a private governance institution cannot 
be consensually defined without a prior process of discussion and negotiation. Accordingly, 
effectiveness cannot be objectively measured without such a process either. In other words, a 
participatory, transparent and responsive deliberative process to define the objectives, 
involving all affected stakeholders, remains necessary, which returns us to the criteria of 
participation, transparency and accountability defined above.
10
  
 
Applying these general ideas to the topic private retail food governance, we find the 
following. Different stakeholders define the objectives of private retail standards very 
differently, even though they all tend to broadly refer to sustainability objectives (Kalfagianni 
2006). Retailers themselves will define sustainability in terms of food safety (narrowly 
defined) and therefore argue that traceability schemes will allow an effective achievement of 
this objective. Environmental, consumer, and animal welfare organisations will add 
environmental and/or animal welfare objectives to the sustainability dimensions required. 
                                                 
10
 Sometimes, participants in the debate will suggest to simply assess the effectiveness of the governance 
institution against its self-set objectives. This process, however, does not provide a way out of the above 
dilemma. After all, institutions may set objectives for themselves that neglect or even hurt the interests of those 
governed. In such a situation, the achievement of the self-set objectives can hardly function as a source of 
democratic legitimacy. 
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Accordingly, retail standards focussing on traceability will fail to provide the desired output 
in their view. Small farmers in developing countries surely would want to add the aspect of 
farmer income and rural livelihoods to the sustainability. However, they tend not to get asked 
(see below).  
 
IV. Assessing the Democratic Legitimacy of Private Retail Food 
Governance  
In order to assess the democratic legitimacy of private retail food governance, we analyzed 
websites and documentation published by the standard owners as well as other stakeholders, 
drew on existing scientific studies, and conducted expert interviews with certification 
agencies and quality managers of supermarket chains to gather supporting evidence. The 
heavy reliance on information provided by the standard owners themselves may give rise to 
concern from a methodological perspective, of course. In the case of our inquiry, however, 
such a concern should only exist if we arrive at highly positive evaluations of the democratic 
legitimacy of the given governance institutions. After all, one would not expect the standard 
owners to intentionally undersell the democratic legitimacy of their institution.  As the 
discussion below shows, however, we do not find positive results for the democratic 
legitimacy of almost all of the private retail food governance institutions analyzed, when 
applying our criteria of participation, transparency and accountability. 
 
Participation 
Institutions of private retail food governance differ in their governance structures and roles 
awarded to different stakeholders. Using this difference in governance structure, one can 
place these institutions along a continuum ranging from retailer dominated ones, to joint 
retailer-producer initiatives, to multi-stakeholder initiatives. The private retail food 
governance institutions introduced above will fall on this continuum as follows:  
 
Table 2. Stakeholder Participation in Private Retail Food Standards and Initiatives 
 
 
CATEGORY 
 
 
STANDARD/ 
INITIATIVE 
 
 
ROLES AWARDED TO ACTORS  
Retailers Food industry/ 
growers/fishery 
Certification 
bodies etc 
Civil society/ 
NGO  
 
 
 
 
Retailer  
BRC Absolute power  
standard owner 
Consultative 
voice only 
Consultative 
voice only 
No voice 
IFS Absolute power 
member 
organisations, 
Consultative 
voice only 
Consultative 
voice only 
No voice 
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Dominated 
 
 
standard owner 
SQF Absolute power 
standard owner 
Consultative 
voice only 
Consultative 
voice only 
No voice 
GFSI Clear majority 
 
Represented 
(Minority in 
Board) 
Consultative 
voice  
Consultative 
voice only 
Participation in 
annual 
meetings and 
regular 
exchange of 
information 
Equal 
partnership 
Retailers 
Producers 
GlobalGap Joint power, 
representative 
democracy 
(elections) 
Joint power, 
representative 
democracy 
(elections) 
Consultative 
voice, only 
associate 
members 
Participation in 
annual 
meetings 
 
 
Multi- 
 
Stakeholder 
 
Initiatives 
MSC 
 
 
Represented 
(minority in 
board) 
Represented (1 of 
3 in board) 
Not in Board 
and 
Committee 
Represented 
(env. NGOs  1 
of 4 in board) 
ETI 
 
Minority in 
board 
Minority in board Not in board 2/3 majority 
in board (trade 
unions and 
developmental 
NGOs) 
 
Most of the retail standards presented in this paper strongly prioritise retail access. BRC, IFS, 
SQF and GFSI in particular are exclusively retailer organisations, allowing other stakeholders 
such as food manufacturers only a consultative role.  
 
BRC started as a pure retail standard but over the years other stakeholders became involved as 
well. Today, representatives from major retailers, manufacturers, certification bodies, the 
United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) and trade associations are involved in the 
development of the standard through the Technical Advisory Committee and the Standards 
Governance and Strategy Committee.
11
 It is clear, however, that British retailers still have a 
decisive voice since the standard is owned by BRC.  Similar observations can be made about 
the IFS and SQF. The SQF standard is owned by FMI, an American organisation of retailers 
and wholesalers. The Technical Advisory council 2008-2009 has 28 members including 11 
retailers and six food manufacturers, predominantly from the USA (22).
12
 Also in IFS, the 
main decision-making bodies, the Board and the International Working Group, give access to 
(German, French and Italian) retailers only. Other stakeholders, in particular manufacturers 
and certification bodies, participate in the Review Committee which has an advisory role.
13
 
                                                 
11
 www.brc.org.uk/standards/default.asp?mainsection_i=1&subsection_id=1 (28-3-2008); similar but not 
mentioning UKAS: www.brc.org.uk/standards/about_background.htm (2005-02-18). The BRC website does not 
provide a list of members of these committees. 
12
 www.sqfi.com/tac_members.htm (14-4-2009). Three members of the TAC are from Australia and 1 from 
Japan, UK, Canada. 
13
 www.ifs-online.eu (28-4-2009) Names of Review Committee members are not available on the website. 
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The GFSI Board of Directors, the main decision-making body, is still dominated by retailers 
(13 out of 16 members) mainly from Europe and USA.
14
 Since September 2006 the Technical 
Committee, advising the Board, includes other stakeholders. Since April 2009, 60 
organisations are represented in the technical committee including 19 retailers, 21 
certification bodies, standard owners or accreditation organisation and 11 food 
manufacturers.
15
 Even there, however, most are from Europe (38) or the USA (16). 
Membership in the Board and Technical Committee is by invitation only.  
 
Concluding, BRC, IFS, SQF and GFSI are dominated by retailers‟ organisations, allowing 
food industry and certification bodies to be represented in the committee that reviews the 
standard and makes recommendations on improvements to the Board. Consumer 
organisations and other NGO‟s are not included in the decision structure of retail standards. 
GFSI is the only one with some food industry representatives on the Board and with a 
structure for information exchange with civil society; it invites all interested parties that want 
a voice in GFSI to participate in annual meetings. 
 
EurepGap (1997) developed from a European retailer initiative into GlobalGap, a global 
standard, with equal participation for retailers and agricultural producers. More specifically, 
both the Steering Committee and the GlobaGap Sector Committees have had 50% retailer and 
50% supplier representation since 2001. GlobalGap is a membership organization. The 
Committees are constituted by members, elected by closed ballot of current retailer and 
supplier members. Each constituency elects its own representatives. Next to retailers and 
suppliers, associate members from the input and service side of agriculture can also 
participate but are not part of the decision making process. In 2009, GlobalGap still has these 
three different types of memberships: 42 retail and food service members (European except 
for 1 Japanese and 2 US), 149 producer/supplier members (41 from outside Europe) and 100 
associate members such as certification bodies, consulting and crop protection industry.
16
 
Only 8 producer/supplier members are from Africa, 7 from Asia and 16 from Central and 
South America. In the sector committtee for crops responsible for revising the standard, 4 out 
of 16 producer members are from Kenia and Brazil. The majority of both retailer and 
                                                 
14
 The Board has six members from Europe, seven from USA and one from China, Japan and Brazil. Three 
board members are from food industry (additionally two adviser members from industry). 
http://www.ciesnet.com (28-4-2009). 
15
 http://www.ciesnet.com (28-4-2009). 
16
 http://www2.globalgap.org  (28-4-2009). 
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producer members in this committtee is from Europe (17 out of 25). However, in 2007 
GlobalGap has started a special project to provide more opportunities for African smallholder 
representation in the standard setting process.
17
 In addition, to facilitate GlobalGap 
certification for small producers it is now possible to get a group certification as a farmer 
group. 
 
The ETI and MSC, finally, can be considered multistakeholder initiatives. The MSC 
developed from a partnership between Unilever and WWF into a multistakeholder 
organization. The initial governance structure of MSC (partnership between Unilever en 
WWF) was criticized by NGOs as lacking credibility, democratic representativity and 
effectiveness (Tully 2004:3). Since 2000, the MSC is governed by the Board of Trustees 
comprised of global fisheries experts who approve plans, targets, strategies, financial 
accountability, and appoint chief board and committee members (Owens 2008). MSC is not a 
membership organization. Trustees are not elected but appointed by cooptation.
18
 Almost all 
trustees are from the USA, Europe or Australia (1 from Latin America), although some of 
them are focusing on fisheries in Africa or the Southern Ocean. Other institutional organs of 
the MSC include the Technical Advisory Board and the Stakeholder Council which advise the 
Board. In addition to the three governance bodies, committees and working groups are set up 
to address specific regional or topical issues. Their members come from the MSC Board, 
Technical Advisory Board and Stakeholder Council, and may include other experts who are 
invited to advise the MSC (http://www.msc.org/about-us/governance/structure). Even though 
the MSC has a multistakeholder governance structure, the highest decision-making authority 
is granted to the Board of Trustees, which is self-recruiting and functions much like a 
corporate board of directors, rather than a stakeholder council (Gulbrandsen 2008). Moreover, 
critical commentators observe discrimination in access to representatives from developing 
countries (Ponte 2007). Even the Stakeholder Council counts only four members in the 
„‟Developing world category‟ (next to 11 in the „public interest category‟ and 16 in the 
„commercial and socio-economic category‟).19 It is further noted that only one of about ten 
workshops carried out since 1997 took place in a developing country (South Africa) (Ponte 
                                                 
17
 http://www.africa-observer.info/ (28-4-2009) 
18
 April 2009 4 trustees from fishing industry, 3 from environmental NGOs (WWF), 3 from science, 2 from 
retail, 1 miscellaneous. (www.msc.org/about-us/governance/structure/board-of-trustees/whos-on-the-msc-board , 
19-04-2008) 
19
http://www.msc.org/about-us/governance/structure/msc-stakeholder-council/whos-on-the-msc-stakeholder-
council (29-4-2009) 
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2007).
20
 MSC has initiated efforts to overcome such criticisms by introducing special 
programs to improve developing countries‟ access to MSC certification and global sustainable 
seafood markets, and assist small scale fisheries to gain access to data and resources needed 
for certification. Even though these efforts might improve market access, they do not 
guarantee more equal representation in decision-making processes, however.
21
   
 
The ETI includes a wide range of stakeholders in its board, as well. With board members 
equally spread over three caucus groups (each with 3 members on the board), ETI allows for 
the most participation of civil society (2 out of 3 member categories: trade unions and 
developmental NGOs). In 2007, 39 companies, four trade unions (TU) and 17 NGOs were 
part of the ETI (Schaller 2007). The NGOs are represented by larger organizations (e.g. 
Oxfam, CAFOD) and smaller, specialized NGOs (e.g. Anti-slavery International, Woman 
Working Worldwide), often with a focus on development or human rights issues. Among TU 
members are the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) and the International 
Textile, Garment and Leather Workers‟ Federation (ITGLWF) (ETI 2007; Schaller 2007). 
Concerns are voiced, however, about access constraints of developing countries due to limited 
resources (Schaller 2007), irregular consultation with workers (Hale 2000, Hale and Shaw 
2001) and unequal power structures between UK retailers and suppliers from developing 
countries (Hughes 2001).  
 
In sum, all private retail standards tend to lack democratic legitimacy from the perspective of 
the participation criterion to some extent. The decision-making bodies frequently do not allow 
participation by all groups affected by these standards. Multistakeholder initiatives can be 
considered more legitimate because they bring together different actors with opposing 
interests trying to reach an agreement on crucial societal issues. It is important to note that 
resource asymmetries still prevent equal participation, even if certain stakeholders are allowed 
participation, however. In consequence, there is a lack of sufficient participation by 
representatives of consumers, developing countries, and environmental and labour 
organizations in all private retail food governance institutions considered here. The degree of 
the severity of the problem clearly varies, however, with retail dominated private governance 
institutions reflecting the lowest degree of democratic legitimacy.  
 
                                                 
20
 Recently a “Sustainable Fisheries Fund” has been set up, independently from MSC, to help developing 
country fisheries to go through the certification process (Ponte 2007). 
21
  http://www.msc.org/about-us/credibility/working-with-developing-countries (29-4-2009) 
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Transparency  
In the cases examined here, the main source of information regarding the standards is the 
web. Up to date information on governance structures, membership and goals is available 
though some standards, especially GlobalGap, MSC and ETI, have more extensive and 
detailed coverage than others. In contrast, BRC is the standard with the most limited 
information on its governance structure. In all cases most of the documents related to the 
development and monitoring of standards are only available to insiders, however. Likewise, 
information on the processes themselves, especially while they are going on, is rarely 
available. In addition, information to the general public is only provided after decisions have 
been made, constraining meaningful intervention from the part of civil society. 
 
In retail dominated standards transparency tends to be selective. These standards strive for 
food safety while ignoring other aspects, such as environmental and social performance, 
which are crucial indicators for the sustainability of the food system. Performance related 
information, however, is available to a certain extent. Thus, an interested party can learn 
about the number of certified producers, for instance, and their geographical coverage. The 
contribution of the standards to food safety concerns is also explained; detailed statistical 
information on the effectiveness of standards in preventing food scares or spreading of 
diseases is not accessible, however. Moreover, there is no external evaluation of the 
standards‟ performance. 
 
Equal partnership standards including environmental and social performance criteria also 
need to report on their performance. In that context, GlobalGap holds a series of “Success 
Stories” where it presents its social and market impact including the launching of new 
certificates, pilot projects, and corporate social responsibility initiatives. As these stories 
constitute selected elements they do not represent the overall GlobalGap performance, 
however. Moreover, similar to the previous cases such reporting is voluntary and has not 
undergone external evaluations.  
 
Multistakeholder initiatives also suffer from selective transparency and performance 
deficiencies, but less so in relation to the other standards. MSC has been criticised, for 
instance, for not providing any details on catch patterns, patterns of industry adoption of 
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practices, by-catch and habitat damage problems and individual producer activities (Iles 
2007). However, since 2005 MSC has initiated an effort to undergo evaluation and report on 
its environmental impact while it currently collaborates with the International Social and 
Environmental Accreditation and Labelling (ISEAL) Alliance to explore the development of a 
Code of Good Practice on Measuring the Impact of Certification.
22
 Finally, even the ETI fails 
to recognize and therefore provide information on important issues such as gendered aspects 
of employment, as discussed earlier (Pearson 2007). Similar to the MSC, however, ETI also 
voluntarily undergoes external evaluation of its performance. More specifically, a study 
completed by the University of Sussex in 2006 reveals to the public the heterogeneous impact 
of ETI depending on companies and type of workers (Smith and Barrientos 2006). Moreover, 
ETI also includes reports on pilot projects from the side of the regulatees, hosting some quite 
critical voices (Turner 2004). These types of transparency activities, in turn, improve the 
reliability of information provided by the standard owners and also enhance the standards‟ 
accountability.  
 
Next to the web, seminars and conferences are held as well. Here openness and availability of 
information also differs among the standards. More specifically, those with strong retail 
participation (e.g. BRC, SQF and IFS) allow access only to members. GFSI allows 
participation of other stakeholders, such as other companies‟ executives as well as suppliers‟ 
senior sales and marketing management personnel. In contrast, GlobalGap, MSC and ETI are 
open to the public upon registration. Moreover, they allow access to minutes of conferences, 
round tables and short video archives. ETI and MSC also publish information on their board 
meetings. However, in those cases too no protocols of caucus group meetings are available 
(see also Schaller 2007). 
 
The language used is mostly non-technical facilitating the comprehensibility of information. 
The majority of sources is in English, although all standards are translated into other 
languages. Thus, BRC is translated into fifteen languages, such as Arabic, Chinese, Thai and 
many European languages. Likewise, SQF is also translated into Spanish. Some standards 
also include information in additional languages in their websites. Thus, next to English, 
GFSI also has reports in French, Spanish, Japanese and Chinese. Likewise, IFS reports in 
English, German, French and Chinese. GlobalGap publishes information in a number of 
European (Dutch, English, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish) and non-
                                                 
22
 http://www.msc.org/about-us/credibility/measuring-environmental-impacts (14.05.09).  
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European (Turkish and Thai) languages. MSC includes information in English, French, 
German, Spanish and Chinese. Finally, ETI publishes some documents in Spanish and 
Chinese as well, while further translations are expected to follow (Schaller 2007). One may 
question, of course, whether the predominance of European languages really facilitates access 
for all affected stakeholders, especially farmers in developing countries. 
 
In sum, transparency increases as participation broadens. Retailer dominated standards are 
less open about their processes and have limited issue coverage. Moreover, information 
provision is voluntary and based on self-reports. In contrast, standards involving more 
stakeholders are relatively more transparent. Detailed information on governance structures, 
membership and projects is available on the web. Moreover, conferences and seminars are 
open to all and relevant information is published on the web, even though board and/or caucus 
group meetings are not made public. Even in multistakeholder initiatives, however, 
transparency tends to be selective in its sustainability coverage. Yet, the reliability of 
information is higher due to external evaluations of the standards‟ performance, thus also 
improving the standards‟ accountability.  
 
 
Accountability 
In all cases examined in this paper, stakeholders need to report on their activities on a 
somewhat regular basis. Supermarkets need to report to their boards and board members to 
their constituencies, while trade union and civil society representatives are also accountable to 
their organisations. Thus, the standards provide a basis for internal accountability. The extent 
to which peer pressure actually is used to ensure compliance may differ, of course. However, 
this is a question on which little information is publicly available.  
 
We do not find critical differences among the standards regarding external evaluations of 
accountability in the narrow sense. Many private food standards rely on third party 
certification for monitoring and enforcing compliance with the standard. A company wishing 
to be certified against BRC, IFS, GlobalGap or MSC, for example, appoints an accredited 
certification body to audit the company. The certification bodies have to be accredited by 
independent accreditation bodies to certify against the standards. With the exception of SQF, 
the standard owners do not decide which organisations are authorized to monitor and enforce 
compliance with the standard. Usually a certified company is audited at least once a year. 
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Some standards also require or allow unannounced audits. An audit report has to be 
technically reviewed prior to the certification decision by the certification body. The person or 
body deciding to grant, suspend, revoke or renew certification should be independent to the 
auditor. Critical or major non-conformity against fundamental requirements of the standard 
should result in suspending or withholding the certification, and a new audit has to begin. 
Minor non-conformities are followed by corrective action and need to be revisited.  
 
Again, little information on the extent to which these mechanisms prevent non-complying 
companies from becoming certified is available. Moreover, critical observers point out 
weaknesses of third-party certification mechanisms. Thus, the certification bodies also 
participate in consulting meetings, working groups, and so on. In most of the cases, the 
certification organisations are trained by the standard owners, while the methodology used in 
the certification process is considered intellectual property right of the standard, and thus 
details remain confidential. In addition, the company wishing to be certified hires the 
certification organisation itself which could provide an incentive to forego rigour in favour of 
future cooperation with the company. Finally, the quality of third-party audits is not always 
ensured. In the case of ETI, for instance, members are concerned about the increase of 
fraudulent practices in auditing, such as the keeping of false records (common practice 
particularly in China) or instructing workers to provide false information (ETI Forum 2006).  
 
More fundamentally, third party certification mechanisms only aim to ensure compliance with 
the standard and thus accountability on the issues covered by the standard at the most. Even in 
these cases, the question is to whom accountability is provided. After all, not everyone 
affected by the standard has paths and instruments available to demand compliance in the case 
of private retail standards. In the case of multi-stakeholder initiatives, the group able to 
demand accountability is by definition broader. Such initiatives also have mechanisms by 
which workers and suppliers can hold the standards accountable to a certain extent. Thus, ETI 
provides an “Alleged Code Investigation Guidelines” which allows NGOs and trade unions to 
forward complaints from Southern members (ETI 2001). Moreover, ETI member companies 
commit to provide secret complaint mechanisms for workers even though few have actually 
done so (Turner 2004).  
 
Yet, the analysis of the distribution of participation above shows that even in multi-
stakeholder initiatives not all groups potentially affected by private food governance 
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institutions are represented. Moreover, the difficulties in attaining transparency from a 
developing country perspective reinforce access inequality. The effectiveness of ETI 
investigation guidelines, for instance, depends on workers knowing about them, but only few 
workers have that knowledge in reality (Schaller 2007). Publication of external evaluations of 
standards‟ performance could improve accountability to the general public. Again, these 
evaluations are made on the basis of the standards‟ own terms of references and do not cover 
externalities or unintended consequences. In sum, external accountability of retail standards is 
fundamentally limited and accountability, as such, cannot serve as a reliable source of 
democratic legitimacy.  
 
The picture with respect to the accountability of private retail food governance is mixed, then. 
Internal and even narrowly defined external accountability frequently exist. Indeed, peer-
review mechanisms or auditing of standards is a feature of most of the standards and 
initiatives considered here. Yet, accountability to the broad range of affected stakeholders is 
given in hardly any institution. In terms of this broader notion of accountability, then, private 
retail food governance institutions tend to exhibit little democratic legitimacy. 
 
V. Conclusions 
In this paper, we analyzed the democratic legitimacy of private retail food governance, using 
the criteria of participation, transparency and accountability. We pursued this investigation 
due to the highly ambivalent implications that private retail food governance exhibits for the 
sustainability of the global agrifood system. In our analysis, we found that the criteria of 
participation, transparency and accountability are entirely fulfilled in none of the cases. In 
terms of participation, we identified a lack of access in the development and monitoring of 
private standards, especially for civil society actors and small farmers and fishermen, 
particularly from the South, as an area of high concern. Interestingly, this is the case even in 
broad multistakeholder standards and initiatives, such as ETI and MSC, which frequently tend 
to have a better image in the public (and even in the scientific) debate. Even here, financial 
and technological constraints impede the participation of resource weak actors, however. 
Moreover, the power asymmetries among the actors involved in private retail food 
governance raise questions about the constraints on actors‟ choice sets even if they are 
allowed to participate. In terms of transparency, we found that it is limited in its external 
dimension, thus weakening the influence of actors besides the standard owners. However, 
differences exist between the standards, with multistakeholder initiatives being considerably 
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more open and reliable in their reporting. Finally, when it comes to accountability, we noted 
that even though internal accountability is provided in most cases, external accountability to 
the general public is either lacking or in need of major improvement.  
 
Indeed, the asymmetries in access and influence between the different stakeholders 
highlighted by an analysis of the three democratic criteria constitute one of the core 
challenges for private food governance and exercise an impact not just on the criterium of 
participation, but also on questions of transparency and accountability. The asymmetries in 
access and influence are also likely to contribute to the mixed impact on the sustainability of 
the global agrifood system that was pointed out earlier. Given the existence of such 
asymmetries, it should not come as a surprise that most private food standards primarily 
reflect the interests of retailers in minimizing the risk of scandals and marketing their products 
to Northern consumers. Therefore, the emphasis rests on food safety and traceability. Some 
environmental and worker welfare issues are included as well, as Northern consumers place 
increasing demands on retailers in this context. The lack of an adequate inclusion of civil 
society organizations in the retail dominated schemes, however, means that the standards tend 
to address these issues only in a selective manner. Finally, small farmers in the South have 
little representation in the decision-making bodies of most of the private food governance 
institutions discussed here and no means to enforce a pursuit of their interests either. 
 
Some of the initiatives discussed do recognise the power asymmetry between the rich world 
and farmers in developing countries, however. Both GlobalGap and MSC have pilot programs 
supporting small producers in developing countries to overcome financial, educational and 
other barriers to certification. Even though such initiatives are welcome, they tend to be the 
exception rather than the rule. Moreover, it will take time to evaluate whether such efforts 
constitute effective and sufficient measures to overcome critical societal concerns.  
 
The result of our analysis of the democratic legitimacy of private retail food governance, then, 
is not an optimistic one. Private food governance may be desirable in a number of ways. 
Thus, it has been connected to some improvements in food safety and quality and even to 
some extent environmental conditions achieved. Yet, its potential negative consequences, for 
instance in terms of the marginalization of millions of small farmers in developing countries, 
are sufficiently severe to remind us of the importance of participation, transparency and 
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accountability in its creation as well as the need for checks and balances on the power 
exercised by the different actors involved, especially the large retail corporations.  
 
Again, establishing institutions that will fulfil the criteria of participation, transparency, and 
accountability in global food governance is extremely difficult. As pointed out above, public 
governance is far from perfect in this respect and one may wonder if it matters to small 
farmers in the South if they lose their livelihoods due to regulations introduced by the EU or 
US government or due to the GlobalGap. In other words, global public food governance 
clearly warrants critical questions regarding its democratic legitimacy as well. Yet, the 
dramatic expansion in private retail food governance, the structural power behind it, and its 
severe social implications highlight the urgent need to improve the situation. Due to the 
obligatory quality private standards assume and their global coverage, the legitimation of 
private food governance becomes a fundamental concern for global governance. Standards 
and certification mechanisms need to be established in a global market with huge information 
asymmetries, complex production chains and distancing between production and consumption 
choices. Yet, the development and monitoring of standards affecting a multitude of actors in a 
multitude of locations, needs to take place in a context where mechanisms of participation, 
transparency and accountability are enforced and fortified.    
 
From a democratic perspective, it is crucial to remember that the institutionalization of new 
forms of governance at the global level is a development in progress. The institutionalization 
and perfection of these forms does not happen automatically or overnight. Instead, it requires 
constant attention and discussion both at the national and global levels. It is the responsibility 
of (democratically elected) governments worldwide to foster arenas where disputes and 
contestations of inadequate forms of governance can take place. The presence of such arenas 
constitutes, in turn, the seed of all democratic transformations.  
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